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BLOOD TEST RESULTS-THEIR ADMISSIBILITY TO SHOW A
DECEDENT'S INTOXICATION
DANIEL E. JOHNSONt
The drinking driver constitutes a hazard on the highways.1 If he
causes an accident he will be hard pressed to conceal the fact of such
drinking. Witnesses may be produced who will testify respecting his
appearance. He may be asked to submit to one of several tests which
evaluate either his performance or his body fluids. If he refuses to sub-
mit an inference arises. But what if he dies in the very accident he
caused? How, then, may his intoxication be established? Among the
many techniques for proving intoxication, the significance of those
loosely grouped as "chemical blood tests" looms far larger when the
drinker is dead. Choosing Indiana as the jurisdiction, it is proposed to
investigate the state of the law respecting the admissibility of chemical
blood test results in a civil action on the issue of the deceased's intoxica-
tion.2 It is assumed that no consent is given to the testing, either by the
deceased prior to his demise or by his personal representative thereafter.
The extraction of blood under these circumstances and the admission into
evidence of the test results suggest the possible violation of certain rights
and privileges, both with respect to the living and the dead. Further,
even granting the admissibility of such results per se, they are only ad-
missible if preceded by a proper foundation. Curiously, the essentials of
this necessary predicate appear far from certain. Finally, if admitted in-
to evidence, what is to be made of the test results? Who may interpret
them and what standards should be used? These general areas (admis-
" Member of the Indiana Bar, associated with the firm of Baker & Daniels, In-
dianapolis, Indiana.
1. Specific studies reveal that drinking drivers and the drinking pedestrians have
been involved in 50% or more of the fatal accidents covered by the various studies.
Further, the percentage appears to be increasing. 1961 ACCIDENT FACTs, annual statis-
tical report of the National Safety Council. The following comment may serve to
point up the incidence of inebriation: "In Maryland, the Department of Post Mortem
Examiners analyzes the blood of drivers and pedestrians who die within 6 hours of a
motor vehicle accident. Among these victims, nearly 3 out of 4 drivers, and 3 out of 5
pedestrians have been found with alcohol in their blood." Alcohol Involvement in Traf-
fic Accidents, in 1961 ACCIDENT FActs.
2. Rare indeed are prosecutions of deceased defendants. Yet the matter of ad-
missibility of chemical blood test results has, at least upon occasion, become relevant in
a criminal action. See Commonwealth v. Capalbo, 308 Mass. 376, 32 N.E.2d 225 (1941).
In Capalbo evidence based on blood taken from the victim belied the defendant's claim
that he killed only in self defense.
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sibility, predicate and interpretation) will be viewed in turn through the
prism of Indiana Law.'
1. THE GENERAL RULE RESPECTING ADMISSIBILITY
By the weight of authority in this county the results of chemical
tests are admissible into evidence in civil actions on the issue of intoxica-
tion, assuming a proper predicate and subject to the rules respecting a
proper taking.' As stated in Wigmore, the condition of intoxication:
"[M]ay be evidenced by chemical tests of the alcohol-content of a per-
son's blood, urine, etc., provided the test is one evidenced to be accepted
in medical science as indicative in the average person of inability to con-
trol his movements intelligently in the usual affairs of life."'  Of course,
such evidence, although generally admissible, is not conclusive and may
successfully be rebutted.
A smaller yet heartening number of decisions have dealt with the
narrower issue of the admissibility of evidence derived from chemical
tests based upon blood extracted from the veins of either a corpse or of a
person since deceased. These decisions indicate that death does not alter
the general rule of admissibility.' In sum, the area of chemical blood
3. The lore of chemical blood tests is rich in technical writings, carefully explain-
ing the needs, methods and limitations of the various types of tests. See DONIGAN,
CHEMICAL TESTS AND THE LAW (1957) ; Ladd & Gibson, The Medico-Legal Aspects of
the Blood Test to Determine Intoxication, 24 IOWA L. REv. 191 (1939) ; Muehlberger,
Medico-Legal Aspects of Alcohol Intoxication, 35 MICH. SBJ. 36 (1956).
4. Rivers v. Black, 259 Ala. 528, 68 So.2d 2 (1953); Nichols v. McCoy, 38 Cal.
2d 447, 240 P.2d 569 (1952) ; McRae v. People, 131 Colo. 492, 286 P.2d 618 (1955) ;
Russell v. Pitts, 105 Ga. App. 147, 123 S.E.2d 708 (1961) ; Woolley v. Hafner's Wagon
Wheel, Inc., 22 Ill. 2d 413, 176 N.E.2d 757 (1961), reversing 169 N.E.2d 119 (1960);
Williams v. Hendrickson, 189 Kan. 673, 371 P.2d 188 (1962) ; Soard v. Rogers' Adm'r,
332 S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1960) ; Robinson v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 255 N.C. 669, 122 S.E.2d
801 (1961) (dictum) ; Fossum v. Zurn, 78 S.D. 260, 100 N.W.2d 805 (1960); Bolieu v.
Fireman's & Policeman's Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. 1959); Baird v.
Cornelius, 107 N.W.2d 278 (Wis. 1961) ; City of Appleton v. Sauer, 271 Wis. 614, 74
N.W.2d 167 (1956); Schwartz v. Schneuriger, 269 Wis. 535, 69 N.W.2d 756 (1955);
Commissioner's Prefatory Note to UNIFORM CHEMICAL TEST FOR INTOXICATION ACT, 9
Uniform Laws Annotated (Supp. 1962) ; DONIGAN, CHEMICAL TESTS AND THE LAW, ch.
2 (1957) ; MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 176, at 375 (1954) ; Annot., 127 A.L.R. 1513 (1940),
supplemented in 159 A.L.R. 209 (1945). A substantial number of additional decisions
clearly presuppose the admissibility of such evidence per se, and reject the specific evi-
dence proffered in the particular case only because of an improper foundation. Such
decisions are nonetheless instructive on the issue of admissibility. Section 11-902(b)
of the UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE, promulgated by the National Committee on Uniform
Traffic Laws and Ordinances (rev. 1956), now specifically provides that evidence re-
specting the amount of alcohol in a person's blood is admissible and entitled to the spe-
cified presumptions in civil as well as criminal proceedings.
5. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 235(4) (3d ed. Supp. 1962).
6. Ravellette v. Smith, 300 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1962) ; Davis v. Brooks Transp. Co.,
186 F. Supp. 366 (D. Del. 1960); Wooley v. Hafner's Wagon Wheel, Inc., 22 Ill. 2d
413, 176 N.E.2d 757 (1961) ; Soard v. Rogers' Adm'r, 332 S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1960) ; Fos-
sum v. Zurn, 78 S.D. 260, 100 N.W.2d 805 (1960) ; Natwick v. Moyer, 177 Ore. 486, 163
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tests appears to be a viable one with the doctrine (and its substantive re-
quirements) evolving rapidly."
2. THE INDIANA RULE RESPECTING ADMISSIBILITY
No reported Indiana decision considers the question of the admis-
sibility of chemical blood test results in a civil action involving the
death of the person whose intoxication is in question, whether the taking
was with or without consent. However, in the 1962 decision of Ravel-
lette v. Smith,' an appeal from a judgment for the defendant in a wrong-
ful death action, this issue was raised in a case where consent was lack-
ing. At the trial evidence based upon an analysis of blood extracted
from the corpse indicated a percentage of alcohol that would have been
sufficient to impair the judgment in a person of physical characteristics
similar to those of the decedent. In response to appellant's contention
that the evidence was inadmissible, the Court of Appeals remarked that:
"As far as we can determine Indiana courts have not passed on the ques-
tion of admissibility of blood tests where the blood was taken from a
dead body without the consent of the next of kin."' The court concluded
that article I, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution (which proscribes
unlawful search and seizure) was inapplicable, since this right was per-
sonal to the decedent, as was his "right of privacy." On this basis the
court distinguished cases involving the taking of blood from unconscious
persons. As to such right as Article I, section 11 (which affords secur-
ity to one's person and effects) gave the plaintiff in her deceased hus-
band's corpse, the court held that his body did not constitute an "effect"
within the language of this provision. Finally, on the authority of
Breithaupt v. Abram10 the blood test was held not to constitute an outrage
P.2d 936 (1945) (dictum) ; Hartman v. Harder, 322 SAV.2d 555 (Tex. 1959) ; Kuroske
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 234 Wis. 394, 291 N.W. 384 (1940) (blood extracted shortly be-
fore death). Other decisions assume such evidence is admissible. McConville v. United
States, 197 F.2d 680 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 344 U.S. 877 (1952) ; Nesje v. Metropolitan
Coach Lines, 140 Cal. App. 2d 807, 295 P.2d 979 (1956) ; McGowan v. City of Los
Angeles, 100 Cal. App. 2d 386, 223 P.2d 862 (1950); Smith v. Mott, 100 So. 2d 173
(Fla. 1957) ; Nicholson v. City of Des Moines, 246 Iowa 318, 67 N.W.2d 533 (1954) ;
Townsend v. Jones, 183 Kan. 543, 331 P.2d 890 (1958) (not admissible without cor-
roborating evidence of intoxication) ; Fletcher v. Flynn, 118 N.W.2d 229 (Mich. 1962);
Osborne v. Colonial Ice Co., 249 N.C. 387, 106 S.E.2d 573 (1959).
7. The change is illustrated by 20 Am. Jun. Evidence § 876 (1939). Although
chemical tests are ignored in the original text as a means of proving intoxication, the
1963 supplement appends over one page of text and authority, beginning at p. 164, to
reflect the adoption in the various jurisdictions either by statute or by common law of
rules permitting the admission into evidence of the results of tests made of various
body fluids for the presence of alcohol.
8. 300 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1962).
9. Id. at 857.
10. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
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or indignity to the decedent's body. Unfortunately, this decision falls far
short of considering all eminent objections to such evidence. These ob-
jections will be considered hereafter.
Only one Indiana decision relating to the use of chemical blood test
evidence in a civil action deserves mention. In Nuewelt v. Roush," the
rejection of evidence based upon a chemical blood test was approved by
the Indiana Appellate Court for lack of a proper foundation. But the
opinion appears to assume the admissibility of such evidence, granting a
proper foundation.
3. THE ANALOGOUS INDIANA RULE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
Broadening the scope of the investigation to include actions of a
criminal as well as civil nature and to include the Harger drunkometer, a
bloodless chemical test, considerably more Indiana authority is available.
Several cases have considered the admissibility, in a prosecution for any
one of several crimes involving drunken driving, of evidence resulting
from chemical tests administered to the defendant, both with and with-
out his consent." Unfortunately, most of these cases did not involve
blood tests; a distinction of potential significance." If the defendant
consented to the testing he is held to have waived such of his objections as
are grounded upon constitutional bases or questions of privilege; the re-
sults of the test are admissible, subject to a proper foundation. 4 And
his intoxication need not invalidate his consent. " Of course, objections
relating to the accuracy of the test and to the qualifications of the medi-
cal expert are preserved in spite of the waiver; it merely permits the test
to be made. But if the defendant-donor did not consent, analogous
11. 119 Ind. App. 481, 85 N.E.2d 506 (1949).
12. Alder v. State, 239 Ind. 68, 154 N.E.2d 716 (1958) (blood test evidence held
barred by physician-patient privilege) ; Alldredge v. State, 239 Ind. 256, 156 N.E.2d 888
(1959) (comment on refusal to take drunkometer test held proper as against self-
incrimination objection; dictum that blood test improper unless consented to) ; Willinnar
v. State, 228 Ind. 248, 91 N.E.2d 178 (1950) (drunkometer test: waiver of objections) ;
Stevens v. State, 240 Ind. 19, 158 N.E.2d 784 (1959) (same) ; Spitler v. State, 221 Ind.
107, 46 N.E.2d 591 (1943) (same) ; Ray v. State, 233 Ind. 495, 120 N.E.2d 176, rehearing
denied, 121 N.E.2d 732 (1954) (drunkometer test; waiver of any objections by failure to
brief; dictum praising the "science" of the Harger drunkometer) ; Wells v. State, 239
Ind. 415, 158 N.E.2d 256 (1959) (chemical blood test; consent to taking). See also
1940 IND. Ops. ATrr'Y GEN. 211, opining the admissibility of Harger drunkometer results
(the reasoning in this opinion would appear not to limit it to criminal prosecutions);
3 INDIANA LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA, Automobiles § 188, at 541 n.85.
13. See notes 23 and 33 infra and accompanying text.
14. Wells v. State, su pra note 12; Stevens v. State, supra note 12; Willennar v.
State, supra note 12; Spitler v. State, supra note 12.
15. Wells v. State, supra note 12; Stevens v. State, supra note 12; 3 WIGmORE, Evi-
DENcE § 84(2) (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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authority suggests that any one or more of several constitutional limita-
tions may be called into play.
4. SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIONS TO ADMISSIBILITY
Granting that evidence based upon the results of chemical blood tests
is not per se inadmissible on the issue of intoxication, assuming a proper
foundation, several objections frequently appear in the decisions which
qualify the general rule of admissibility. These objections will be con-
sidered in an order which reflects the amount of concern they appear to
have caused the judiciary.
(a) Privilege Against Self-Incrimination. Although earlier deci-
sions were troubled by this privilege, it now appears to be generally ac-
cepted that the privilege, both state and federal, relates only to testimonial
compulsion. As such it does not apply to blood tests or to the examina-
tion of other body fluids.16 This distinction has been accepted in Indi-
ana.' Further, when the donor is deceased at the time the evidence is
proffered an additional consideration facilitates its admission. As sagely
observed in Hartnan v. Harder, "the claim of self-incrimination could
not possibly apply here because the donor was dead and could not be
prosecuted.""
(b) Udawful Search and Seizure. Article I, section 11, of the In-
diana Constitution virtually copies the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution in affirming "the right of the people to be secure in
their persons . . . and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure."
Since Mapp v. Ohio"0 it appears that the federal exclusionary rule as in-
grafted upon the fourth amendment is also contained in the fourteenth
amendment, hence binding upon Indiana courts. However, Indiana had
already adopted the exclusionary rule, at least respecting evidence secured
in violation of article I, section 1l,"° and, possibly, in violation of any
constitutional safeguard." Apparently Indiana retains the common law
rule concerning evidence which is seized illegally but in violation of no
constitutional right. 2
16. McCoRmIciK, EVIDENCE § 126 (1954); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2263, 2265(McNaughton rev. 1961) ; Rule 25(c), Uniform Rules of Evidence; Annot. 164 A.L.R.
967, 972 (1946) supplemented in 25 A.L.R.2d 1407, 1409 (1952).
17. Alldredge v. State, 239 Ind. 256, 156 N.E.2d 888 (1959) (citing Indiana and
general authority) ; 1940 IND. OPs. ATT'y GEN. 210.
18. 322 S.W.2d 555, 559 (Tex. 1959). See also Davis v. Brooks Transp. Co., 186
F. Supp. 366 (Del. 1960).
19. 367 U.S. 543 (1961).
20. Rohlfing v. State, 230 Ind. 236, 102 N.E.2d 199 (1951) ; Callendar v. State, 193
Ind. 91, 138 N.E. 817 (1923).
21. Hunt v. State, 216 Ind. 171, 23 N.E.2d 681 (1939) (dictum).
22. Ibid.
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Since evidence is inadmissible if obtained pursuant to an illegal
search and seizure it becomes appropriate to inquire as to whether a
chemical blood test performed on a corpse may constitute an illegal search
and seizure, assuming a lack of consent. It has been stated, with relation
to blood extraction, that a lawful taking is predicated upon either such
search as is incident to a lawful arrest or upon possession of a search
warrant, hence implying that in other situations the taking might be in
violation of this right." However, other discussions have regarded this
right as protecting a person's home and possessions rather than his physi-
cal makeup.2
The right to be secure in person and property is a right which is
personal to the individual claiming it. Frequently the rule is asserted in
this broad and unqualified form.2" Thus the beguiling answer to any
assertion of constitutional violation by the successors in interest of a de-
ceased donor is that his right perished with him. As stated in Ravellette
v. Smith :26
In the instant case, decedent was dead when the sample was
taken. The law, frequently expressed, is that the rights guaran-
teed by the search and seizure provisions of state and federal
Constitutions are personal rights. . . . Decedent's right, being
personal, could not survive his death and cannot validly be urged
by plaintiff.
But what of the argument that a decedent's personal representative or
heir succeeds to such a right? In Studabaker v. Faylor,2 s a civil action
involving a privileged communication rather than an unlawful search and
seizure, the court recognized that the right to evoke the privilege is per-
sonal but proceeded to suggest that it might lie with the personal repre-
sentative or with the heirs. Whatever the potential for objection here,
it has not been successfully employed in decisions involving deceased
donors.
There is one other factor. The plaintiff in Ravellette suggested that
the taking of blood from her deceased husband's corpse violated not only
23. Foust & Davis, Medico-Legal Aspects of Blood Extraction, 52 J. of the Ind. S.
Medical A. (1959). Perhaps the taking of blood from a corpse by or under the direc-
tion of public authority in situations where malfeasance is suspected is a proper exercise
of the state's police power. For example, the coroner may order an autopsy for investi-
gative purposes. See DONiGAN, CHEMICAL TESTS AND THFE LAW 153 (1957).
24. Ladd & Gibson, Medico-Legal Aspects of Blood Tests, 24 IOWA L. REv. 191
(1939).
25. McCoy v. State, 141 Ind. 104, 170 N.E.2d 43 (1960).
26. 300 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1962).
27. Id. at 857. See also Hartman v. Harder, 322 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. 1959).
28. 52 Ind. App. 171, 98 N.E. 318 (1912).
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the decedent's right under article I, section 11, to be secure in his person
(which was disposed of as having perished with him), but also the right
of his widow, the plaintiff, to be secure in her "effects," his corpse being
one of her effects. This intriguing assertion was disallowed by the court.
In conclusion, despite the theoretical objections discussed herein, the
decisions most closely in point do not indicate that any violation of the
constitutional right to be secure in person and property occurs when re-
sults based on chemical tests of blood taken from a corpse without per-
mission or a warrant are admitted into evidence. 9
(c) Due Process. At least until Mapp v. Ohio, the federal due
process clause was available as a crude limitation on such state action as,
had it been done by federal officers, would have formed the basis for an
exclusion of the evidence. But the limitation was an extreme one and
applied only to conduct such as to shock the conscience.8" In Breithaupt v.
AbramO' the United States Supreme Court held that the extraction of
blood from an unconscious man for purposes of a chemical test to deter-
mine intoxication was not such conduct as "shocked the conscience."
However, the due process ("due course of law") provision found in
article I, section 12, of the Indiana Constitution may impose a stricter
standard. In Alldredge v. State,32 a prosecution for operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, testimony re-
specting the refusal to submit to a drunkometer test was admitted over
defendant's objection. But the Indiana Supreme Court, in dictum, cast
some doubt upon Indiana's attitude towards such chemical blood tests as
involve a physical invasion of the body for the extraction of blood. The
court's language was as follows: "We hold that there was no error in
the admission of the evidence of a refusal to take a drunkometer test
where there is no evidence to show such a test would involve a physical
invasion of the accused's body, which amounts to a violation of due
process." " Since the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Rochin v. Californiad4 appeared to be regarded as significant by the Indi-
ana Supreme Court, one may ponder whether Breithaupt was called to its
attention. Nonetheless, Alldredge is its latest statement.
29. Any discussion of illegal search and seizure assumes that the blood was taken
by order of some governmental authority, e.g., a state or city policeman, rather than by
a private person. In the latter situation, the constitutional right to be secure in person
and property from unlawful search and seizure is simply not involved. 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2184a, at 50 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
30. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
31. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
32. 239 Ind. 256, 156 N.E.2d 888 (1959).
33. Id. at 270, 156 N.E.2d at 894. (Emphasis added.)
34. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
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(d) Privileged Communication. Betwen Physician and Patient. By
statute a majority of jurisdictions recognize as privileged confidential
communications between physician and patient arising out of that rela-
tionship. The scope of the privilege is rather narrowly drawn. In Indi-
ana it apparently applies only to physicians," and may be waived." A
further limitation on the privilege is reflected in certain decisions which
restrict its scope by so defining the physician-patient relationship as to
exclude situations in which blood was taken by a physician for reasons
(such as testing for intoxication) not related to the patient's treatment
and for which the patient was not charged." If the blood was taken by
a physician who did not (otherwise) treat the patient, the exclusion is
more obvious and the privilege is inapplicable.
The physician-patient privilege receives scant treatment in those de-
cisions which involve chemical tests of blood extracted from decedents.
Apparently the capacity to invoke or waive the privilege as to communi-
cations which occurred during the lifetime of the patient is not lost on
his death but passes to his personal representative. But as to the "com-
munication" which occurred when blood was extracted from the corpse
after deatl, different considerations obtain. Since a "communication"
includes non-verbal information obtained from observation of the pa-
tient 0 a blood test would appear to qualify. Yet it is generally accepted
that the privilege does not apply to an autopsy,"0 apparently on the theory
that one cannot doctor a dead man. Presumably the same rationale, hence
the same exception, would apply to the extraction of blood from a corpse;
the difference, if any, appears only to be one of degree in the extent of
the "taking." Thus, at least in theory, blood extracted from a corpse for
chemical testing would be an exception to the physician-patient privilege
even if extracted by a physician.
To the recognized rule in the case of autopsies, the Indiana Appel-
late Court took exception in Mathew v. Rex Health & Acc. Ins. Co."
35. General Acc., Fire & Life Assur. Co. v. Tibbs, 102 Ind. App. 262, 2 N.E.2d
229 (1936) (privilege not applicable to a nurse, the statutory term "physician" referring
only to one possessing a degree of doctor of medicine). See also Block v. People, 125
Colo. 36, 240 P.2d 512, cert. denied 343 U.S. 978 (1951) (medical technician excluded).
36. Schlarb v. Henderson, 211 Ind. 1, 4 N.E.2d 205 (1936) (the patient's calling
two physicians as witnesses waived the privilege of confidentiality respecting a third
who was not called by the patient).
37. See Hanlon v. Woodhouse, 113 Colo. 504, 160 P.2d 998 (1954) ; Ladd & Gib-
son, supra note 24.
38. Studabaker v. Faylor, 52 Ind. App. 171, 98 N.E. 318 (1912) ; Annot. 31 A.L.R.
167 (1924).
39. 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2384 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
40. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2382(4) (McNaughton rev. 1961); McCoRMIc3c, Ev1-
DENCE § 102 (1954) ; Annot. 58 A.L.R. 1134 (1929).
41. 86 Ind. App. 335, 157 N.E. 467 (1927).
610
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But the court appeared to regard as crucial the consideration that the
physician who performed the autopsy and the physician who had treated
the victim while alive were employed by the same hospital, hence that by
the stratagem of bringing in a new physician the privilege could be cir-
cumvented. In dictum the court suggested that had the autopsy been per-
formed by a physician who was not connected with prior treatment the
results would not have been privileged.2 If the Indiana rule is any
broader than this, it can scarcely be said to command general acceptance. 3
There is authority to support the proposition that the privilege does
not apply to information which a physician obtains and places in a death
certificate.4 But quite aside from the narrow scope of this exception,
it is not recognized in Indiana."
Are there any Indiana decisions which consider this privilege in a
situation where either the attending physician or one a stranger to the
patient extracted blood thereafter used in a chemical blood test to deter-
mine intoxication? In Alder v. State,"0 a prosecution for involuntary
manslaughter, the attending physician extracted blood from the defendant
for purposes of classification, hence of treatment, while the patient was
unconscious. Some of the blood was thereafter tested chemically for
alcohol. The testimony of the physician in identifying the blood was
rejected by the Indiana Supreme Court by analogy to Chicago L.S. &
S.B. Ry. v. Walas,4 where testimony of a physician respecting the drunk-
en condition of a man he thereafter treated as a patient was held priv-
ileged. Note that the physician in Alder did actually treat the defendant,
hence was his physician. But the Alder case is scant authority when con-
sidering a case in which the extraction was made from a corpse.
It remains to treat of the unusual wording of the Indiana privileged
communication statute, which, provides: "Who are incomnpetent.-The
following persons shall not be competent witnesses: . . . Fourth. Phy-
sicians, as to matters communicated to them, as such by patients, in the
course of their professional business, or advice given in such cases."4
The statute suggests not the creation of a privilege (which may be
waived by nonexercise) but an absolute disqualification of the witness
(which serves to bar any testimony within the defined areas). But as
42. Id. at 337, 157 N.E. at 46.
43. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Quaker City Life Ins. Co., 146 A.2d 580 (D.C. Munic.
Ct. App. 1958).
44. See McCoreuicx, EVIDENCE § 104 (1954); 8 WIG MORE, EVIDENCE § 2385(a)
(McNaughton rev. 1961).
45. See Gibralter NMut. Life Ins. Co. v. Pitts, 182 N.E.2d 450 (Ind. 1962).
46. 239 Ind. 68, 154 N.E.2d 716 (1958).
47. 192 Ind. 369, 135 N.E. 150 (1952).
48. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1714 (Burns 1946).
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observed by at least one writer," the statute characterizes in terms of
competency not only the absolute disabilities of insanity and infancy but
also communications between persons in four different relationships. The
rules respecting these four classes are generally regarded as sounding in
privilege, and the Indiana decisions actually treat the rule enunciated in
subparagraph "Fourth" as a privilege rather than a matter of com-
petency.
°
Thus it appears that the rule is really a privilege and that, should it
even be applicable to the mere extraction of blood from a corpse, and
assuming a proper exercise of the privilege by the deceased's personal
representative, it would be unlikely to bar any testimony except that of a
physician who was involved in the subject's treatment prior to his demise.
(e) Right of Privacy. Both Ravellette v. Smith"' and Fret- v.
AndersonP2 suggested that such right of privacy as existed in a deceased
donor died with him and could not be claimed by his estate or next of
kin. Ravellette, of course, also considered the rights of the widow-
administratrix in the corpse of the deceased husband yet recognized no
actionable violation and held the resulting evidence to be admissible. In
cidentally, the possibility that an actionable tort was committed by the
unprivileged touching of the deceased was observed but apparently not
favored by the Fretz court.
Certainly a right of privacy exists in Indiana. In Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Burton," an insurer was held to have committed a tort against the
widow of the insured by conducting an autopsy on the corpse in an effort
to determine the cause of death and defeat her claim under the policy.
Yet the right is a; limited one which attempts a balancing of conflicting
interests. Surely the mental suffering attributable to knowledge that
a blood test was conducted on a corpse prior to embalming cannot be
substantial. By way of analogy, it is apparently established that the
plaintiff in a personal injury action can be compelled to submit to a
physical examination."4  And if, as has been suggested by the Indiana
Attorney General,55 an individual may be forced to submit to a blood test,
why is it improper to take the same liberty with a corpse?
49. Note, 27 IND. L.J. 256 (1953).
50. Id. at 264. See, e.g., the reference in Alder v. State, 239 Ind. 68, 154 N.E.2d
716 (1958), to the communicated matter as "privileged," and the express statement to
this effect in Stayner v. Nye, 227 Ind. 231, 85 N.E.2d 496 (1949).
51. 300 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1962).
52. 5 U.2d 290; 300 P.2d 642 (1956).
53. 104 Ind. App. 576, 12 N..2d 360 (1938).
54. 25 CJ.S. Damages § 174 (1961); 9 INDIANA LAW ENCYCLOPFDIA, Damages §
164 (1958).
55. 1940 IND. Ors. ATrT'y GEN. 211.
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Occasionally references are found to a constitutional right of "per-
sonal security.""6 This is an amalgam, its components being treated under
headings such as "right of privacy" and "privilege against self-incrimina-
tion."
(f) Hearsay. In Hartman v. Harder,"7 a civil action in which the
admission into evidence of the results of a chemical blood test for in-
toxication was held to have been erroneous since the predicate was in-
adequate, the objection was also raised that the admission into evidence
of a letter certifying as to the results of the test constituted hearsay. This
objection was rather summarily dismissed by the court, suggesting that
the letter might have been admissible under the Texas public records
statute. Indiana has enacted neither the Uniform Business Records as
Evidence Act,"5 the Uniform Official Reports as Evidence Act, nor the
Photographic Copies of Business and Public Records as Evidence Act,
although it has enacted a statute permitting photographic copies of busi-
ness (not public) records to be admissible in evidence as an original when
the latter would have been." But this statute appears to provide no as-
sistance in making business records admissible. Query as to whether the
public records exception might not be available, assuming a duty, a pub-
lic officer and record, and the employment of a customary routine."
Of course, the question of hearsay can only arise to the extent that
the witness is unable to testify respecting the test and its results from per-
sonal knowledge. In the great majority of decisions it appears that no
writing was used and that the witness or witnesses did so testify. What-
ever the theoretical admissibility of a written report, the persuasive ad-
vantage of first hand knowledge appears almost to compel the use of
testimony if at all possible.
(g) Dead Manz's Statutes. The Indiana dead man's statute provides
in part that:
In suits . . . in which an executor or administrator is a
party, involving matters which occurred during the lifetime of
the decedent, where a judgment . . .may be made . . . for or
against the estate . . . any person who is a necessary party to
56. See 16 CJ.S. Constitutional Law § 205 (1956).
57. 322 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. 1959).
58. In Natwick v. Moyer, 177 Ore. 486, 163 P.2d 936 (1945), the court stated, as
dictum, that hospital records showing the results of the blood test would have been
admissible as a "business record."
59. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1649 to -1652 (Burns Supp. 1962). A short discussion of
the use of the business records exception and the official records exception to the hear-
say rule in the case of medical or hospital reports is contained in Annot. 21 A.L.R.2d
1216, 1238-39 (1952).
60. See Smith v. Mott, 100 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1957).
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the issue . . . whose interest is adverse to the estate, shall not
be a competent witness as to such matters .... "'
Although the test about which testimony would be given certainly oc-
curred after the decedent's death, this testimony is relevant only as it
shows a condition (intoxication) which existed "during the lifetime of
the decedent." Hence, this element of the statutory definition may not
be relied upon as an exclusion.62  However, the statute requires that the
witness be adverse in interest to the estate in order for the incompetency
to obtain. In Lake Erie & W.R. Co. v. Charman,6" a wrongful death
action (in which, by statute, the recovery is for the exclusive use of the
named beneficiaries and not the estate), it was held that the defendant
was not incompetent under the Indiana statute since his interest, although
obviously adverse to that of the statutory beneficiaries, was not adverse
to that of the estate. It is believed that the physician or technician who
would testify as to a chemical blood test lacks the adverse interest pre-
supposed by this statute.6"
5. THE NECESSARY PREDICATE
Probably more rejections of evidence obtained from chemical blood
tests have occurred because of what the court termed an inadequate predi-
cate or foundation than have occurred as a result of all other objections
combined. Accordingly, attention will now be directed to the essentials
of the necessary predicate.6"
(a) Identity of the Blood Sample. It is hardly open to dispute that
evidence derived from a blood test for alcoholic content is inadmissible
until it is shown that the tested blood came from the person whose in-
toxication is in question.66 The difficulties latent in attempting to prove
that the same blood which was extracted from the corpse was tested by
(or under the supervision of) the medical expert are indicated by Nichols
61. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1715 (Burns 1946) (Emphasis added.)
62. See 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 225, at 693 n.54 (1957).
63. 161 Ind. 95, 67 N.E. 923 (1903).
64. See 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 145 (1957) ; 30 INDIANA LAw ENCYCLOPEDIA, Wf'it-
nesses § 42 (1960).
65. For a general review of the problems see McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 176 (1954)
(numerous other authorities cited therein) ; 20 Am. JuR. Evidence § 876 (Supp. 1962) ;
5A Am. JuR. Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 1347-50 (1956); Annot. 127 A.L.R.
1513 (1940), supplemented in 159 A.L.R. 209 (1945). For a more detailed discussion
see RICHARDSON, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ch. 13 (1961). A model direct examina-
tion of the noted toxicologist, C. W. Muehlberger, appears as an appendix to DoXIGAN,
CHEmICAL TESTS AND THE LAW 71-80 (1950). CHEMICAL TESTS AND THE LAW is a
comprehensive treatment of the entire area of chemical blood tests, including great de-
tail on the intricacies of the necessary predicate.
66. E.g., Nesje v. Metropolitan Coach Lines, 140 Cal. App. 2d 807, 295 P.2d 979
(1956) ; Neuwelt v. Roush, 119 Ind. App. 481, 85 N.E.2d 506 (1949).
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v. McCoy," the appeal of a wrongful death action in which the issue of
the decedent's intoxication loomed large. Evidence based upon an ex-
amination of blood extracted from the corpse by the embalmer was ad-
mitted over objection that the tested blood might not have been that of
the decedent. After a detailed tracing of the blood vial from body to
test tube the court held the resulting evidence inadmissible. This decision
was subsequently reversed 8 on the ground that the report of the county
toxicologist was admissible under the Uniform Business Records as Evi-
dence Act. Nonetheless, in order to satisfy the condition precedent of
relevancy, the Supreme Court of California carefully detailed the various
facts which tended to show that the blood received by the coroner's office
and tested by the toxicologist really belonged to the decedent.
In Robinson v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co.,69 an action on a life insurance
policy which excluded benefits when death resulted from intoxication, the
court quoted with approval from Benton v. Pellum,7" in the process of ex-
cluding evidence derived from a blood test for insufficient foundation:
[I] t is generally held that the party offering such speci-
men is required to establish, at least as far as practicable, a
complete chain of evidence, tracing possession from the time
the specimen is taken from the human body to the final cus-
todian by whom it is analyzed. . . . As stated in Rodgers v.
Commonwealth, 197 Va. 527, 90 S.E.2d 257, 260: "Where the
substance analyzed has passed through several hands the evi-
dence must not leave it to conjecture as to who had it and what
was done with it between the taking and the analysis."'"
The case of State v. Werling2 has been referred to as an example of the
ideal proof : one or two witnesses whose testimony forges a chain of
custody linking the extracted with the examined blood. The same care
in tracing should be taken during the period the blood passes from hand
to hand in the testing laboratory; it should not be regarded as sufficient
merely to trace the blood to the laboratory. 4
67. 235 P.2d 412 (Cal. D.C. App. 1951).
68. 38 Cal. 2d 447, 240 P.2d 569 (1952).
69. 255 N.C. 669, 122 S.E.2d 801 (1961).
70. 232 S.C. 26, 33-34, 100 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1957).
71. 255 N.C. at 674, 122 S.E.2d at 804.
72. 234 Iowa 1109, 13 N.W.2d 318 (1944).
73. Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 1216 (1952).
74. For other decisions considering the identity of the blood sample see McGowan
v. City of Los Angeles, 223 P.2d 862 (Cal. 1950) (action for personal injuries; issue of
intoxication of deceased driver; blood extracted by embalmer and tested by county
toxicologist; excluded because of doubts which funeral home procedure raised respect-
ing identity); Woolley v. Hafner's Wagon Wheel, Inc., 22 IIl. 2d 413, 176 N.E.2d 757
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(b) Integrity of the Blood Sample. Granting that it was the de-
cedent's blood that was tested, it is also crucial to establish that no
foreign matter was introduced into the blood prior to the test. It is
proper to inquire as to whether the container in which the blood was
placed was properly sealed immediately thereafter," whether, in the case
of a deceased blood donor, extraneous matter had been injected into the
corpse as an incident to the embalming process before the blood was
extracted (apparently some embalming fluids contain alcohol);76 and
whether the blood sample was in an unchanged condition when tested."
In sum, proof of the integrity of the blood sample would include testi-
mony showing a proper extraction, labeling, transportation and delivery
of the sample, perhaps supplemented by the introduction of the container
itself.
(c) Relevancy in Point of Time. The principle of relevancy is sald
to require that the sample or test not be remote in time from the condi-
tion sought to be discovered." But alcohol apparently is consumed at a
known rate by the body, hence an expert may "work backwards" from
the time his sample was taken for at least some period.7" And the addi-
tion of preservatives should allow some delay in testing a blood sample
(1961) (dramshop action by widow for death of husband, decision of appellate court at
169 N.E.2d 119 (1960), excluding evidence, reversed on issue of identity of blood test;
emphasis on fact that all "internal workings," witnesses and records of laboratory were
shown); Newton v. City of Richmond, 198 Va. 869, 96 S.E.2d 775 (1957) (criminal
action; eminent toxicologist analyzed blood but could only identify it by label the con-
tainer bore; held insufficient) ; Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Chugg, 6 U.2d 399, 315
P.2d 277 (1957) (declaratory judgment by insurer for determination that deceased in-
sured (Chugg) was intoxicated; blood test evidence excluded when no witness could
positively say blood taken from Chugg) ; Robinson v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 255 N.C.
669, 122 S.E.2d 801 (1961) (action on life insurance policy; defense of intoxication;
evidence of blood test taken at funeral home excluded when extracter could not remem-
ber incident, hence positively identify the blood) ; Kuroske v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 234
Wis. 394, 291 N.W. 394 (1940) (action against insurer on life insurance policy; de-
fense of intoxication; evidence that blood sample passed through unidentified hands and
was accompanied by same from admittedly intoxicated man; held that jury could have
doubted identity of the sample); Fretz v. Anderson, 5 U.2d 290, 300 P.2d 642 (1956)
(personal injury action under survival statute; extracting physician testified respecting
blood; admitted).
75. Kuroske v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra note 74; Newton v. City of Richmond,
.rpra note 74.
76. Robinson v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., supra note 74.
77. Voolley v. Hafner's Wagon Wheel, Inc., supra note 74. The Woolley decision
contains the implication that the standard of proof respecting matters such as the identity
and integrity of the sample is lower in a civil than in a criminal action. It also ab-
solves the civil plaintiff from much of the duty of justifying the ordinary routine of a
laboratory and insuring the freedom of the test from error; if satisfactory to the
doctors, the court observed, it should be satisfactory to the courts.
78. Robinson v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., supra note 74; RICHARDSON, MODERN SCIEN-
TIFIC EVIDENCE § 176, at 376 n.12 (1961) ; 20 Am. JuR. Evidence § 876, at 160 n.10.3
(Supp. 1962) ; 5A Am. JuR. Accidents and Highway Traffic § 1247, at 1009 n.20 (1956).
79. McCoRaICK, EVIDENCE § 176, at 376 n.12 (1954).
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previously extracted. Nonetheless, what drinking driver would not
stoutly maintain that most of the alcohol in his system was ingested as
"one for the road" immediately before getting into the car and was not
yet in the blood when the accident occurred, although admittedly so some
time later when the test was administered?
(d) Accuracy of the Test and the Testing. A person who has been
qualified as an expert before the trier of fact should explain the nature
of the test employed in some detail. I-Ie should be able to attest to the
good mechanical condition of the necessary apparatus and state that the
test was actually made, if not by him personally, by some one under his
immediate supervision. If cross examination reveals that he is ignorant
of the chemicals used in the test, or the exact manner in which the par-
ticular test was conducted, a risk is generated not only as to credibility
but even as to admissibility. He should be able to vouch as an expert
both for the accuracy of the test and for the particular results obtained in
the instant case. One danger, where use is made of a genuine expert, is
that the very magnitude of his experience prevents any recollection as to
the details of a particular test. Resort may be attempted to present
recollection refreshed or even to past recollection recorded.
(e) Significance of the Results. The witness should be able not
simply to observe the results of the test but to explain their significance
to the trier of fact."0 If the witness must rely upon a chart in order to
reach his conclusions, they may be stricken, upon proper objection, as
based upon hearsay."' Thus it is necessary to differentiate between the
expertise necessary to report the results of the test (which presupposes
proof of skill in testing) and the expertise necessary to assess the effect
of the tested percentage of alcohol in the subject's blood (which pre-
supposes qualification as an expert respecting interpretation), s2 The ex-
pert may explain the significance of the test results and offer his opinion
as to whether that amount of alcohol would be "sufficient to impair
judgment in a person with physical characteristics similar to the de-
cedent's." 3  The statutes of some states contain percentages, the func-
tion of which is to define the significance of certain alcohol readings
under various chemical tests.8 4 But reliance upon this statute in a civil
case may prove to be dangerous for reasons which will now be treated.
80. The tests are meaningless until interpreted. Lewis v. Firestone, 130 A.2d 317
(D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1957).
81. Hill v. State, 158 Tex. Crim. 313, 256 SAV.2d 93 (1953).
82. See Annot. 77 A.L.R.2d 971 (1961).
83. Ravellette v. Smith, 300 F.2d 854, 856 (7th Cir. 1962).
84. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2003(2) (Bums 1952).
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5. AVAILABILITY OF A STATUTORY STANDARD RESPECTING INTOXICATION
The enormous increase in the use of chemical tests for intoxication
throughout the nation is reflected in the ever growing number of juris-
dictions which, by statute, now permit the results of such tests to be ad-
mitted into evidence.8 5 Further, many states admit such evidence through
judicial decision even in the absence of appropriate legislation." None-
theless, the decisions indicate a reliance upon the statute extant in the
particular jurisdiction in order to establish the effect of various concen-
trations of alcohol in the blood. 7 Thus, the inability to use a statute is
important not so much because of the possibility that the test results are
thereby rendered inadmissible as because it is necessary to produce a
medical expert who can testify as to the significance of these results.
Conceding that use of a statute authorizing chemical blood test results is
desirable in a civil action, is it available? Decisions in certain civil ac-
tions exclude reference, to the particular state's alcoholic percentage
statute on the basis that it was obviously intended to be applicable only
to criminal prosecutions.88 Other decisions apply the statute in civil
actions.8" Decisions from other jurisdictions are only instructive, how-
ever, if the exact language of the particular statute is examined.
Indiana's version of the above statute0 was originally enacted as a
part of a comprehensive statute regulating highway traffic.9 The sub-
division in which the chemical test for intoxication provision was found
85. In 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2265, at 394, n.6 (McNaughton rev. 1961), it is
stated that 33 jurisdictions have enacted statutes relating to the use of chemical tests to
determine intoxication and to the admissibility of the results of such tests in evidence
on that issue. But in Uses of Chemical Tests for Intoxication, a report of the Commit-
tee on Alcohol and Drugs of the National Safety Council (1962), it is stated that as of
July 1, 1962, there were 36 states with chemical test laws. According to this report the
only states lacking some such legislation at this time were Alabama, Alaska, California,
Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, North Caro-
lina, Ohio, Oklahoma and Texas.
86. The decision of Breithaupt v. Abram 352 U.S. 432 (1957), at 436, n.3 observes
that at that time (when only 23 states had statutes respecting chemical tests for in-
toxication) 47 states used such tests.
87. The validiy of legislation creating a presumption of intoxication based upon
blood tests is considered in Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1176 (1956). It is reported in 9
UNIFOR LAWS ANNOTATED 50 (Supp. 1962), that all present American legislation on
this point employs the .05%-.15% percentage requirements.
88. See Russell v. Hammond, 200 Va. 600, 106 S.E.2d 626 (1959). Note the court's
analysis of the statute's structure as indicative of its purpose and application. Ad-
mittedly, the Virginia statute analyzed in Ruessell is not similar to Indiana's Act and it
is, 'by its terms, limited to criminal prosecutions. See also, Fossum v. Zurn, 78 S.D.
260, 100 N.W.2d 805 (1960) at page 811.
89. See Williams v. Hendrickson, 189 Kan. 673, 371 P.2d 188 (1962) (remarking
that the language of the statute does not limit its application to criminal actions).
90. IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2003(2) (Burns 1952).
91. Ind. Laws 1939, ch. 48.
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was concerned only with the definition of three crimes, one of which was
"driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic
drugs." 2  Finally, the wording of the particular section containing the
chemical test provisions gave further strength to the inference that the
provision related only to criminal prosecution.03  Hence, an intent to limit
the purview of the provision to certain criminal prosecutions seems
apparent."
It is true that criminal standards are often engrafted upon the law
of torts, providing standards of a sort upon which civil negligence may
be predicated."'  Yet intoxication is not, per se, negligence'0 but only a
predisposing factor in its commission. Hence it would appear the doc-
trine that violation of a criminal statute is negligence per se simply has
no application. The Indiana statute creates no offense but only a tech-
nique whereby the commission of certain offenses is gauged in terms of
presumptions.
Although there are several Indiana criminal prosecutions in which
this statute was employed, no appellate decisions have been found utiliz-
92. Ind. Laws 1939, ch. 48, art. V.
93. Ind. Laws 1939, ch. 48, art. V, § 54(2). Section 52 defined the three offenses
to be covered by art. V; § 53 purported to establish provisions regulating "proceedings"
under § 52; § 54 also was entitled "Provisions For Proceedings Under Subsections (a)
and (b) of Section 52." Within § 54, § (2) contained the chemical test provisions; §§
(1), (3), & (4) clearly related only to criminal prosecutions.
94. Suspicion that § 54 was intended only to support criminal prosecutions for
violations of § 52 appears confirmed by reference to the terns employed in this section
itself, quite aside from its context and title. The section begins by presupposing an
indictment or information as the pleading initiating the acton. The three categories of
alcohol content, after being defined in terms of percentages (under .05, .05 to .15, over
.15) are assigned a significance (1) "within the meaning of the statutory definitions of
the offenses," (2) "within the meaning of this act," and (3) "within the meaning of
the statutory definitions of the offenses," respectively. Two of the three references ap-
pear to countenance use of these standards only respecting the "offenses" defined in
§ 52. Does the third reference, being simply to "this act," suggest that the test may be
used as a standard by which to gauge intoxication when considering any violation of ch.
48? This chapter does create a substantial number of statutory regulations respecting
such matters as speed, passing, turning, etc., 'but they do not appear to be couched in
terms of "offenses." Also, § 160 states that violation of any provision of the act is a
misdemeanor unless otherwise stated to be a felony. Apparently, then, the one reference
to "act" in § 54(2) really means "article." Further, §§ (3) and (4) of § 54, repealed
in 1955, clearly countenanced only criminal prosecutions. If the legislative intent in
amending this section so as to delete subsections (3) and (4) was to evince the avail-
ability in civil as well as criminal actions of the statutory standard for gauging intoxica-
tion, this intent was rather carefully masked. In sum, the internal evidence, although
scarcely conclusive, does not appear to countenance its use in civil proceedings.
95. A careful discussion of this general subject under Indiana law may be found
in Note, 35 Irnj. L.J. 45 (1959).
96. See Townsend v. Jones, 183 Kan. 543, 331 P.2d 890 (1958) ; 38 Ald. Jun. Neg-
ligeiwe § 36 (1959). But see McConville v. United States, 197 F.2d 680 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied 344 U.S. 877 (1952) (assuming, arguendo, that the proven degree of intoxication
did not constitute negligence, the presumption was rebutted by other evidence).
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ing the statute in a civil action. In Spitler v. State," a significant Indi-
ana decision, the state supreme court referred to this statute, observing
that by it "the general assembly undertook to authorize the use of evi-
dence of this character in a prosecution of this kind. . . . "" Spitler, of
course, involved a criminal prosecution. Was a distinction intended be-
tween a "prosecution" and other actions; between proceedings "of this
kind" and civil proceedings? In Kuroske v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,99 a civil
action, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered it relevant to observe
that Indiana had a statute defining the effect of chemical blood test evi-
dence. The observation would have been irrelevant had the Wisconsin
court considered the Indiana statute to be limited to criminal prosecu-
tions. In any event, the civil litigant who, by phrasing his instructions
to the jury in terms of the statutory percentages established under the
Indiana statute, elects to clothe his opponent in the mantel of one "driving
under the influence of intoxicating liquor," should proceed with caution.
In Mattingly v. Eisenberg,' the Arizona Supreme Court considered it to
be reversible error for the trial court to instruct the jury that the statu-
tory percentages of alcohol in the blood were applicable as standards and
cr'eated a presumption in the case. Since the statute was applicable only
to criminal prosecutions, the instruction constituted an unwarranted com-
ment on the evidence.
The question of the applicability of a chemical test statute for in-
toxication in civil as well as criminal cases could readily be resolved by
the legislature. In five states statutes now expressly so provide."' It
would seem an appropriate area for legislation since the present statute's
applicability is questionable at best. Further, it would seem appropriate
as legislation; if the tests are sufficiently accurate to warrant admission
of the results in a criminal action, a fortiori as to their admissibility in a
civil action where questions need only be resolved by a preponderance of
the evidence rather than beyond all reasonable doubt.12
97. 221 Ind. 107, 46 N.E.2d 591 (1953).
98. Id. at 108-09, 46 N.E.2d 592.
99. 234 Wis. 394, 231 N.W. 384 (1940).
100. 79 Ariz. 135, 285 P.2d 174 (1955).
101. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3507 (Supp. 1962); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95Y2, § 144
(Smith-Hurd 1958); N.Y. VEHIcLE & TRAFFIC § 11194 (only if arrested) ; N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 39-20-07 (Supp. 1961) ; WIs. STAT. ANN. § 325.235 (1958). Section 11-
902(b) of the UNIFORm VEHICLE CODE, promulgated by the National Committee on Uni-
form Traffic Laws, as amended in 1962, permits the results of such tests to be intro-
duced in civil as well as criminal cases. The 1956 version referred in terms only to
criminal prosecutions.
102. The ready availability of competent testing media and the admissibility of the
results stand as a safeguard to all unjustly accused of driving while under the influence
of intoxicants, whether the forum be civil or criminal, since the test will show sobriety
as well as its opposite.
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As previously mentioned, the statute should not be regarded as es-
sential to the admissibility of the test results,"0 3 although a more exacting
burden would be placed upon the medical witness if there were no ap-
plicable statute. He must then (1) explain the test, (2) interpret its
results, and (3) vouch for the accuracy and effect of such test upon its
subject.
6. DESIRABLE LEGISLATION
Present uncertainty in three areas of chemical blood test evidence
could be resolved by statute. The desirability of a statute applicable to
civil as well as criminal proceedings has already been observed. The
myriad pitfalls of the necessary predicate could in large measure be
avoided by specifying an acceptable yet feasible procedure for extracting
the blood, safeguarding its identity and condition, testing its contents,
reporting the results and interpreting these results.' Administrative
convenience would appear to justify the admissibility of the test report
when duly certified as an official record as against the objection of hear-
say."" Finally, the obstructionist's plaint that rights were infringed by
an unprivileged taking could, at least as to all but constitutional objec-
tions, be silenced by the adoption of an implied consent statute.' Such
a statute0 7 would make consent to a chemical test for intoxication upon
request by the proper authorities a condition precedent to the licensed
operation of a motor vehicle on the public roadways.0
103. Such evidence should nonetheless be admissible under the general authority
cited in notes 4 and 5 supra.
104. Note the specificity of the Virginia statute which is quoted at considerable
length in Wade v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 117, 120-22, 116 S.E.2d 99, 102-03 (1960).
Questions such as who pays for such a test, whether the suspected drunk (or his suc-
cessors in interest) may demand a test, and whether the failure to request a test may be
commented upon may also be determined by legislative fiat.
105. Statutory safeguards could, for example, make the report available to the
tested party at any time upon request.
106. The Report of the Controller on Alcohol and Drugs, National Safety Council,
Uses of Chemical Tests for 1ntoxication (1961) reports that such statutes exist in Idaho,
Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont
and Virginia.
107. Regrettably, an implied consent statute failed of adoption during the 1963
session of the Indiana General Assembly. For a symposium on the significance and
effect of a statute authorizing the use of chemical tests to determine intoxication in
motorists see Intoxication and Law Enforcemient, a report of the 1962 Institute of Mu-
nicipal Government, Wilkes College, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.
108. Actually the driver may still refuse to submit to the test, hence unpleasant
scenes at the police station are not likely. But his refusal may be commented upon, and
may justify revocation of his operator's license. Further, a deceased driver is not in a
position to refuse the test; by statute his successor in interest and personal representa-
tive should not be. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANx. § 39-20-03 (Supp. 1961) which pro-
vides: "Any person who is unconscious or who is otherwise in a condition rendering
him incapable of refusal shall be deemed to have withdrawn the consent provided by
Section 39-20-01 and the test or tests may not be given. Nothing herein shall prevent
the taking of the test or tests from a dead person."
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